anonymous
Guest
anonymous
Guest
Here’s how this was supposed to work:
1. Everyone knew access would be bad at launch for a new drug in this category. You were told this at the launch meeting.
2. To gain access, BMS needed to prove there was demand in the market for it, so that payers would give up existing, lucrative rebates from other drugs in favor of Sotyktu financial incentives.
3. It was reps’ job to generate demand based on clinical superiority to Otezla AND the guarantee of free drug while the access situation was poor. Cozy relationships with Derms were supposed to help with the sale because non-Derm reps can’t even get in the door.
Bottom line: if there’s no demand, then access won’t happen. Those are just the facts of this market.
So what would you brainiacs have done differently?
We would have had leaders who understand that derm is just different. It's not fungible with other Pharma spaces and the experience the McKinsey types have with marketing in cardiology and neurology don't work.
We would have had leaders who understood that to generate the demand needed to convince the PBMs to give us access, only one thing matters -reps in front of derms selling. Period. End of story. Instead, we spend 40% of every week out of the field. Do you really thing business reviews drive business?
We would have had leaders that when times got hard, didn't resort to old tired formulas such as "asking better questions", or "better pre-call plans" or "executional excellence", or "hard closing for appropriate starts". No we need to be left alone to make calls and drive demand anywhere.
Finally, we would have had leaders that targeted Otezla failures first(and there are plenty of of them(up to 75% of their starts)). Instead, we went out and bashed them. Told derms they were idiots for their past 8 years of experience and we asked for their starts right then. We should have gone for everything we could have gotten and built from there.
Get back in your cube you failure.