Glossary of Hostile Takeover Terms with Discussion

  • Shoham   Mar 20, 2016 at 01:53: PM
Dan and 551,

I read in some articles that the PFE/AGN deal is an inversion and I also see it referred to as a reverse merger. Which is it and is there a difference?

Thanks

Inversion and Reverse Merger used to mean the same thing: A mergers where the legal surviving corporation (buyer) is, in actuality, the seller as far as control is concerned. Historically, there were not many reasons to invert (usually the buyer was the more established corporation, whose legal structures were more worthy of preserving), and inversions were rare. However, circa 2002, Valeant discovered a tax loophole that allowed Inversions to be used to move US corporate domicile overseas and reduce tax liability. After they did it successfully, many followed, and usage of the word Inversion has morphed into referring to any transaction that achieves this expatriation tax benefits -- including transactions that are not Reverse Mergers.

Reverse Mergers continue to refer to transactions where the actual and legal buyer and seller are reversed (whether or not this is done for tax reasons).

The Actavis acquisition of (old) Allergan was an Inversion, but not a Reverse Merger. It was an Inversion because it achieved the tax benefits of expatriating Allergan (to Ireland). It was not a Reverse Merger because the legal buyer (Actavis) was also the one retaining control (subsequent name change to [new] Allergan notwithstanding, it was still Actavis that bought [old] Allergan).

The contemplated PFE/AGN transaction is an old fashion Inversion. It meets both definitions. Allergan is legally the buyer, even though control will pass to Pfizer -- so it's a Reverse Merger; and it is to achieve the tax benefits of expatriation -- so it's also an Inversion.

Dan.
 


















Excellent discussion, I have learned a lot, thank you. Any idea on a timetable for the AGN/PFE deal? Since many will be losing their jobs and are currently looking, it would be beneficial to have some info.
 












[continued]

So, what's next: Ackman is right (for a change) that Valeant needs to start liquidating and fast. Don't worry about "core" and "non-core" (as MP is still muttering), sell anything you can get a decent price for. If enough is sold between now and when the debt holders will have the right to demand early payment (a bit over a month from now), it might be possible to remove the Going Concern language (technically, the language is as-of the last day of 2015, but Auditors can have a bit of leeway, say, if the company raised a ton of cash through asset sales in early 2016, to conclude that, actually, they were not a going concern risk on 12/31/2015 after all); or to buy down a lot of debt. Unfortunately, for them, between the taint on all their assets and the fire sale situation, this is going to be very tough. Additionally, two of the largest potential buyers, Allergan and Pfizer, can't easily buy anything until their own merger either closes or breaks. Valeant will probably get some bond holders to give them more time, but unless they get every last one of them (75%+ in each bond issue), it's worthless (but they'll still make a big announcement out of it).

One last thought: I've previously accused Valeant (in the middle of the Allergan takeover battle), when they lowered guidance, of swallowing more poison than they needed to; so, on the next quarter they can beat guidance and raise future guidance to have momentum going into the Allergan special shareholder meeting (which ended up never happening). I was right then. They did, the very next quarter, beat their lowered guidance and raised future guidance (giving their share price a bump as big as the earlier drop -- even though the "raise" was to a lower level than the prior drop). Allow me to go on record making this accusation again. I think that the 2016 guidance is deliberately lowered more than necessary, so once they get out of the immediate default risk emergency, they can start raising guidance and make it look like they are on an upswing. However, this time, I don't think it'll work. First, because I don't think they'll pull out to begin with -- I think they'll end up in bankruptcy and asset liquidation (unless they manage to sell off a lot of assets beforehand; it which case the guidance is meaningless anyhow). And, second, even, if by some miracle they do pull out without massive asset sales, the damage they are doing now exceeds whatever "momentum" they'll have later. Also, the momentum thing only works when management has credibility, and this one no longer has any.

Dan.
 












[continued]

So, what's next: Ackman is right (for a change) that Valeant needs to start liquidating and fast. Don't worry about "core" and "non-core" (as MP is still muttering), sell anything you can get a decent price for. If enough is sold between now and when the debt holders will have the right to demand early payment (a bit over a month from now), it might be possible to remove the Going Concern language (technically, the language is as-of the last day of 2015, but Auditors can have a bit of leeway, say, if the company raised a ton of cash through asset sales in early 2016, to conclude that, actually, they were not a going concern risk on 12/31/2015 after all); or to buy down a lot of debt. Unfortunately, for them, between the taint on all their assets and the fire sale situation, this is going to be very tough. Additionally, two of the largest potential buyers, Allergan and Pfizer, can't easily buy anything until their own merger either closes or breaks. Valeant will probably get some bond holders to give them more time, but unless they get every last one of them (75%+ in each bond issue), it's worthless (but they'll still make a big announcement out of it).

One last thought: I've previously accused Valeant (in the middle of the Allergan takeover battle), when they lowered guidance, of swallowing more poison than they needed to; so, on the next quarter they can beat guidance and raise future guidance to have momentum going into the Allergan special shareholder meeting (which ended up never happening). I was right then. They did, the very next quarter, beat their lowered guidance and raised future guidance (giving their share price a bump as big as the earlier drop -- even though the "raise" was to a lower level than the prior drop). Allow me to go on record making this accusation again. I think that the 2016 guidance is deliberately lowered more than necessary, so once they get out of the immediate default risk emergency, they can start raising guidance and make it look like they are on an upswing. However, this time, I don't think it'll work. First, because I don't think they'll pull out to begin with -- I think they'll end up in bankruptcy and asset liquidation (unless they manage to sell off a lot of assets beforehand; it which case the guidance is meaningless anyhow). And, second, even, if by some miracle they do pull out without massive asset sales, the damage they are doing now exceeds whatever "momentum" they'll have later. Also, the momentum thing only works when management has credibility, and this one no longer has any.

Dan.

Dan - In the Valeant Q2 2015 SEC 10Q, Valeant included the following statement regarding FASB guidance on management disclosure of ongoing concern, which is to take effect for annual periods ending after Dec 15, 2016. Is this the same FASB guidance applicable to PWC's obligations as an independent auditor, or is this something totally different? Thanks in advance. (p.s., that same 10Q has a copy of a major Valeant credit agreement that has the various default provisions that you have to weed through. Couldn't find one that said "default" if its independent auditor included a "going concern" statement, though it is a complicated morass of interlinked default provisions among sections 2, 5, 6, and 8 of the agreement.)

"In August 2014, the FASB issued guidance which requires management to assess an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide related disclosures in certain circumstances. Under the new guidance, disclosures are required when conditions give rise to substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern within one year from the financial statement issuance date. The guidance is effective for annual periods ending after December 15, 2016, and all annual and interim periods thereafter. Early application is permitted. The adoption of this guidance will not have any impact on the Company’s financial position and results of operations and, at this time, the Company does not expect any impact on its disclosures."
 






  • Shoham   Mar 20, 2016 at 11:01: PM
Dan/Shoham,

BTW, Dan is my first name, Shoham is my last name. No need for a "/" between them. There is just one of us. :p

You make a truly excellent (cogent and reasonable) and reasonably convincing case for this being a GC situation. The hypothetical back-and-forth you showed was, however, biased on your assumption that it is a GC situation where PWC will ding it.
The "Imagine a conversation" bit was just to show, in a simplified manner that would be understood by non-accountants, how Valeant could be filing with the SEC that the reason the audited report is delayed AHC slowness; when, in fact, the real issue is a Going Concern Disclosure.

The actual manner through which such would transpire would be far less simplistic. Most likely, based on the kind of questions PWC was asking and the type of procedures they were performing, Valeant realized that they are going to get a huge impairment hit on Goodwill, and, a consequent GC. So, they stalled the audit process to give themselves a little time to do "something."

... That said, if this were a GC issue, the board would have known about it months ago I expect, and would have made efforts of any kind to avoid it (some asset sales, etc). A GC issue would not have popped up suddenly Feb28. For that, I am surprised we haven't seen asset sales announced, or more progress on the Walgreens deal (any additional sales revenue helps VRX on both SOTP asset valuation for PWC and cash flow near-term for creditors even if it is done at lower margin).

Pure speculation: They probably figured it's coming somewhere near Feb 1, and tried talking their way through it for much of February, before realizing PWC is firm. I am further guessing that there is too much disarray to start a concerted, rapid, orderly liquidation; and a fear that if they are seen trying to sell assets, everyone will realize the magic wand is broken (only in Valeant central, is there a remaining shred of belief that there are people out there who still believe in the magic wand; even Ackman no longer believes in it).

...
I agree with you on the likely lack of significant accounting fraud. I believe there are possibly insurance fraud issues, but I think the liability for that is probably years away, and I think is probably relatively limited in size.).

Insurance Fraud Liability = (Philidor revenues) * 3

(RICO RICO RICO)

Not enough to bring the company down on it's own, but another $1B liability on the balance sheet can't be that good.

They should be thankful Philidor got stopped when it did. If it had survived for another year, it might have reached the point of being able to bring the company down on it's own.

Eventually though, I think Valeant's key role as over-leveraged avatar of the healthcare 'bezzle' is what has endangered it. Valeant overpaid for its collection of sub-prime assets using sub-prime loans - a lot of them. And we know what happened in 2008 and 2009 - the equity tranche of those subprime loans got the short end of the stick.

That's where you and I totally agree. The question is if PWC is willing to sign an unqualified opinion this year because the inevitable insolvency is further down the line; or are they going to make a stand and GC now. I vote for the latter.

Dan/Shoham,

The other possibility I am entertaining (other than GC) is a substantial write down of goodwill at Valeant as per what P551 was mentioning above.

I think the two come together. The Goodwill writedown, while not a cash event itself, is just an accountant-speak way of saying the assets are worth less than we thought before. Since the assets were bought with debt, "less than we thought before" is a short distance from negative equity (owe more than own), which is a short distance from GC.


As far as I know the debt covenants do not include an asset value or book value/ratio trigger so it wouldn't have imminent repercussions, but it might make a financing roll a bit more difficult in 2018, and it would likely impact the perceived selling value of those assets which had just been marked down if Valeant needed to raise cash before that, so MP and the board would probably fight as hard as they could against that.

We'll see.

This is, potentially, the heart of the matter; and could force an immediate GC even if the actual insolvency is multiple years away.

If you are planning on doing some digging, that's where I'd suggest you go and look. Specifically, is there anything in the covenant of any of the bonds or loans that would break if some figures or ratios (particularly balance sheet ratios, but also revenue numbers) fail to meet a threshold? If there is, do you think the ratio was likely breached.

I'd almost want to dial back and say that the hold-up could be explained by any covenant-breaching trigger, not necessarily, specifically GC (since the same argument -- That Valeant would rather be late, and experience a slow-motion covenant breach than release the report and have an instant breach). But, I am not dialing back, because anything that (incurably) breaches any covenant, would place Valeant in a position of being unable to meet the immediate obligations, and thus instantaneously graduate to a GC.

Said differently: If there is even one tinny winy bond that has some small print saying the company must maintain a book value of at least $X (or else the entire debt amount is immediately due and payable), and other bonds have (fairly standard) language saying that a default on one bond is a default on all, then a big writedown of Goodwill -- big enough to bring the book value below $X -- has the effect of putting the company in an instant cascade of defaults: They failed to meet the tinny winy bond covenant, so they are in default there; consequently they are in default everywhere; consequently they are required to pay back all their debt immediately; but they don't have the cash, so they are no longer a going concern. PWC, which, as part of their job, reads every little clause in every bond agreement, knows that this cascade will happen as soon as they release the audited financial (or, for that matter, as is happening now, if Valeant plays cute and not release it at all), so they have to put a GC.

(if it really is just one tinny winy bond, they can pay them, and only them, a fee -- before releasing the audited statement -- so they'll agree to take this one clause off; and then block the above-described GC cascade. Valeant is saying they are negotiating with creditors now. They wouldn't be if the Audited was GC-free and it was just a matter of paying some accountants overtime to get it out quickly; so this scenario may well be what's currently playing out).

The bottom line is that there are multiple direct threads that start with Goodwill writedown and end in immediate GC.

(And I always come back to my basic thesis: no matter how bad the Audited report is, if it isn't GC, then it isn't as bad as what Valeant is doing to themselves by not releasing it; therefore, it must be GC).

Dan.
 






BTW, Dan is my first name, Shoham is my last name. No need for a "/" between them. There is just one of us. :p


The "Imagine a conversation" bit was just to show, in a simplified manner that would be understood by non-accountants, how Valeant could be filing with the SEC that the reason the audited report is delayed AHC slowness; when, in fact, the real issue is a Going Concern Disclosure.

The actual manner through which such would transpire would be far less simplistic. Most likely, based on the kind of questions PWC was asking and the type of procedures they were performing, Valeant realized that they are going to get a huge impairment hit on Goodwill, and, a consequent GC. So, they stalled the audit process to give themselves a little time to do "something."



Pure speculation: They probably figured it's coming somewhere near Feb 1, and tried talking their way through it for much of February, before realizing PWC is firm. I am further guessing that there is too much disarray to start a concerted, rapid, orderly liquidation; and a fear that if they are seen trying to sell assets, everyone will realize the magic wand is broken (only in Valeant central, is there a remaining shred of belief that there are people out there who still believe in the magic wand; even Ackman no longer believes in it).



Insurance Fraud Liability = (Philidor revenues) * 3

(RICO RICO RICO)

Not enough to bring the company down on it's own, but another $1B liability on the balance sheet can't be that good.

They should be thankful Philidor got stopped when it did. If it had survived for another year, it might have reached the point of being able to bring the company down on it's own.



That's where you and I totally agree. The question is if PWC is willing to sign an unqualified opinion this year because the inevitable insolvency is further down the line; or are they going to make a stand and GC now. I vote for the latter.



I think the two come together. The Goodwill writedown, while not a cash event itself, is just an accountant-speak way of saying the assets are worth less than we thought before. Since the assets were bought with debt, "less than we thought before" is a short distance from negative equity (owe more than own), which is a short distance from GC.




This is, potentially, the heart of the matter; and could force an immediate GC even if the actual insolvency is multiple years away.

If you are planning on doing some digging, that's where I'd suggest you go and look. Specifically, is there anything in the covenant of any of the bonds or loans that would break if some figures or ratios (particularly balance sheet ratios, but also revenue numbers) fail to meet a threshold? If there is, do you think the ratio was likely breached.

I'd almost want to dial back and say that the hold-up could be explained by any covenant-breaching trigger, not necessarily, specifically GC (since the same argument -- That Valeant would rather be late, and experience a slow-motion covenant breach than release the report and have an instant breach). But, I am not dialing back, because anything that (incurably) breaches any covenant, would place Valeant in a position of being unable to meet the immediate obligations, and thus instantaneously graduate to a GC.

Said differently: If there is even one tinny winy bond that has some small print saying the company must maintain a book value of at least $X (or else the entire debt amount is immediately due and payable), and other bonds have (fairly standard) language saying that a default on one bond is a default on all, then a big writedown of Goodwill -- big enough to bring the book value below $X -- has the effect of putting the company in an instant cascade of defaults: They failed to meet the tinny winy bond covenant, so they are in default there; consequently they are in default everywhere; consequently they are required to pay back all their debt immediately; but they don't have the cash, so they are no longer a going concern. PWC, which, as part of their job, reads every little clause in every bond agreement, knows that this cascade will happen as soon as they release the audited financial (or, for that matter, as is happening now, if Valeant plays cute and not release it at all), so they have to put a GC.

(if it really is just one tinny winy bond, they can pay them, and only them, a fee -- before releasing the audited statement -- so they'll agree to take this one clause off; and then block the above-described GC cascade. Valeant is saying they are negotiating with creditors now. They wouldn't be if the Audited was GC-free and it was just a matter of paying some accountants overtime to get it out quickly; so this scenario may well be what's currently playing out).

The bottom line is that there are multiple direct threads that start with Goodwill writedown and end in immediate GC.

(And I always come back to my basic thesis: no matter how bad the Audited report is, if it isn't GC, then it isn't as bad as what Valeant is doing to themselves by not releasing it; therefore, it must be GC).

Dan.
Dan, I will take a look too. I know in my teeny weeny company our covenants are very specific on debt/equity, book value, interest coverage multiples on revenue, etc. We are always being measured against these covenants. Being non compliant can result in big problems or simple negotiated work around, but they are always noted by our auditors!

I'll check back soon

P551
 






  • Shoham   Mar 20, 2016 at 11:50: PM
Dan - In the Valeant Q2 2015 SEC 10Q, Valeant included the following statement regarding FASB guidance on management disclosure of ongoing concern, which is to take effect for annual periods ending after Dec 15, 2016. Is this the same FASB guidance applicable to PWC's obligations as an independent auditor, or is this something totally different? Thanks in advance. (p.s., that same 10Q has a copy of a major Valeant credit agreement that has the various default provisions that you have to weed through. Couldn't find one that said "default" if its independent auditor included a "going concern" statement, though it is a complicated morass of interlinked default provisions among sections 2, 5, 6, and 8 of the agreement.)

"In August 2014, the FASB issued guidance which requires management to assess an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern and to provide related disclosures in certain circumstances. Under the new guidance, disclosures are required when conditions give rise to substantial doubt about an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern within one year from the financial statement issuance date. The guidance is effective for annual periods ending after December 15, 2016, and all annual and interim periods thereafter. Early application is permitted. The adoption of this guidance will not have any impact on the Company’s financial position and results of operations and, at this time, the Company does not expect any impact on its disclosures."


This would seem to not be relevant here since it doesn't apply to the delinquent 2015 annual report.

I'll admit I'm not up on every FASB rule phase-in, but at first read it seems that whereas the old rule has been for the auditors to issue a Going Concern Disclosure when appropriate (and that hasn't changed); the new rules also require management to proactively make that determination themselves. This way, if there was no GC and the company breaks for foreseeable reasons, management won't be able to say "sorry, we didn't see it coming and the auditors didn't either." Under the new rules, it is management's job to proactively foresee and disclose any foreseeable insolvency.

In any event, I don't think we are in a situation where management is more transparent than the auditors...

Thanks for pointing out the source. I'm not motivated enough to go study credit agreements (I'm doing this for fun, no one is paying me) right now; but maybe, at some point I'll decide to just go and do it (as I did with my earlier R&O/Philidor mini-investigation).

Dan.
 






  • Shoham   Mar 21, 2016 at 02:15: AM
Allergan: Deal Spread Just Touched A New High $AGN http://www.seekingalpha.com/article/3959765

Even though the spread is hitting new highs (both in absolute and percentage terms), I'm not reading it as a further erosion in the market's estimation of the likelihood of a deal (which I continue to rate as "less likely than not").

The formula that connects the spread to a merger likelihood estimation looks at where will the share price go if there is no deal (always speculative, but something on the order of where it was before the deal buzz started moving the share price would be a good ballpark guess) versus where it will go if there is a deal (that part is not speculative, since we know the deal parameters). If the spread is growing, it would normally mean that the likelihood of a deal is declining (at least, as measured by the collective wisdom of those buying and selling shares). But, it could also mean that the no-deal share price is declining.

As the violent Valeant implosion is sending repercussions through the entire sector, companies that have some degrees of similarities to Valeant are taking collateral damage. The more a company is perceived to be like Valeant, the more damage the share price has taken. Those companies run by ex-Valeant executives who (previously) prided themselves as Valeant clones (they aren't saying that any more, are they?), took some serious double-digit-percent hits. Allergan may not be a clone of Valeant, but it is still in the same space, and that space is, right now, coming under scrutiny. Pfizer, on the other hand, is sufficiently far, in just about any way you can measure, from Valeant to not take much guilt-by-association damage at all.

That's why, in my opinion, Pfizer has taken minimal damage, while Allergan took some (but nothing like the mauling that the Valeant clones took). And that's why the spread has grown.

Dan.
 






This would seem to not be relevant here since it doesn't apply to the delinquent 2015 annual report.

I'll admit I'm not up on every FASB rule phase-in, but at first read it seems that whereas the old rule has been for the auditors to issue a Going Concern Disclosure when appropriate (and that hasn't changed); the new rules also require management to proactively make that determination themselves. This way, if there was no GC and the company breaks for foreseeable reasons, management won't be able to say "sorry, we didn't see it coming and the auditors didn't either." Under the new rules, it is management's job to proactively foresee and disclose any foreseeable insolvency.

In any event, I don't think we are in a situation where management is more transparent than the auditors...

Thanks for pointing out the source. I'm not motivated enough to go study credit agreements (I'm doing this for fun, no one is paying me) right now; but maybe, at some point I'll decide to just go and do it (as I did with my earlier R&O/Philidor mini-investigation).

Dan.
There needs to be something announced in the next day or so regarding VRX. Something or someone needs to take the blame! Maybe Pearson will get axed! Call me crazy but there needs to be a visible step towards convincing the market that the company is under control. My money is on Ackman forcing Pearson out. Poetic justice if you ask me.

P551
 












mike Pearson out!! Finally my trust in my own judgement of what are unethical business practices stand vindicated. But Guess he already made millions beyond what his IQ, work ethic deserved. He destroyed so many careers in the process!!

Can't imagine how he lives his life reflecting on his own deeds.... Shameless.
 






  • Shoham   Mar 21, 2016 at 10:51: AM
There needs to be something announced in the next day or so regarding VRX. Something or someone needs to take the blame! Maybe Pearson will get axed! Call me crazy but there needs to be a visible step towards convincing the market that the company is under control. My money is on Ackman forcing Pearson out. Poetic justice if you ask me.

P551

Hey, p551, awesome call here!

I do want to say that, for the first time in the nearly 2 years since I started this thread, Valeant did something right. It might still be too late to save the equity holders, but at least they are facing the real issues.

I don't just mean mp firing -- that was preordained in any event and should have been done in November (I honestly thought, when he went on medical leave, that it was a face-saving way to fire him; but then he came back...). It is also the tone of the announcement that admitted the issues were at the top (not some junior people making errors) and that auditors were deliberately misled.

Putting Ackman on the board, in such a high-profile manner, is, as I read it, effectively broadcasting that his medicine (liquidate assets, and fast) is now official policy. As per my prior postings, this is really the only route that has any chance of saving the equity holders (might not be a great chance, but better than mp and his core-non-core muttering).

I've hardly turned into a vrx fan, but they did do something right for a change.

Dan
 






Hey, p551, awesome call here!

I do want to say that, for the first time in the nearly 2 years since I started this thread, Valeant did something right. It might still be too late to save the equity holders, but at least they are facing the real issues.

I don't just mean mp firing -- that was preordained in any event and should have been done in November (I honestly thought, when he went on medical leave, that it was a face-saving way to fire him; but then he came back...). It is also the tone of the announcement that admitted the issues were at the top (not some junior people making errors) and that auditors were deliberately misled.

Putting Ackman on the board, in such a high-profile manner, is, as I read it, effectively broadcasting that his medicine (liquidate assets, and fast) is now official policy. As per my prior postings, this is really the only route that has any chance of saving the equity holders (might not be a great chance, but better than mp and his core-non-core muttering).

I've hardly turned into a vrx fan, but they did do something right for a change.

Dan
Too good not to share: Blame game begins. Do you think criminal charges come next? http://www.businessinsider.com/howard-schiller-former-valeant-cfo-lawyer-statement-2016-3
 






OK everyone. Here's a thought that will have you puking in your mouth...what if VRX/Ackman approach Pyott to be CEO! I'm sure he wouldn't do it but the karma would be fitting. We will have to watch and see what happens but with the B&L part of VRX being about the only bright spot that we can glean, Pyott or other ex AGNers makes sense. Ball, ex CEO of Hospital, firmer AGN is another. With AGN fully tucked in at the PFE table a key buyer of B&L is sidelined. VRX might be best to use this as bait to lure an ex AGNer in.

Fascinating turn of events.

P551
 






OK everyone. Here's a thought that will have you puking in your mouth...what if VRX/Ackman approach Pyott to be CEO! I'm sure he wouldn't do it but the karma would be fitting. We will have to watch and see what happens but with the B&L part of VRX being about the only bright spot that we can glean, Pyott or other ex AGNers makes sense. Ball, ex CEO of Hospital, firmer AGN is another. With AGN fully tucked in at the PFE table a key buyer of B&L is sidelined. VRX might be best to use this as bait to lure an ex AGNer in.

Fascinating turn of events.

P551


Please! Pyott doesn't need the headache! He is retired and filthy rich!