When will we know

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Those is the know, know the following to be true.

When BH choose MA over JF, we were strong but faced with an enormous patent risk and fundamental questions about our future because of it. The stock was strong, but inside the suite and with the board, it was known a risk had to be taken with I&I to save us.

I&I had one product that could be the foundation and that was apremilast. Then, the following happened:

1-BH lost out to his ego and he wanted to run for office (this is forgivable)
2-MA was chosen over JF (hard to stomach, but forgivable)
3-SS was chosen over ST (the right call)
4-SS took a big swing with GED-0301 (biotech takes big swings and misses often - not fatal)
5-the Otezla number was taken down (horrible, -near fatal and it was the wrong call)
6-ozanimod RTF (near fatal)

Really a perfect storm. An outgoing chairman focused on betting Menendez, a new CEO that didn't catch the ozanimod screw up, and inexperience taking down the Otezla number together proved fatal.

But make no mistake, we would have been purchased long before this one had we never launched I&I. We simply couldn't sell the paper anymore given the Rev patent risk.
 






anonymous said:
Those is the know, know the following to be true.

When BH choose MA over JF, we were strong but faced with an enormous patent risk and fundamental questions about our future because of it. The stock was strong, but inside the suite and with the board, it was known a risk had to be taken with I&I to save us.

I&I had one product that could be the foundation and that was apremilast. Then, the following happened:

1-BH lost out to his ego and he wanted to run for office (this is forgivable)
2-MA was chosen over JF (hard to stomach, but forgivable)
3-SS was chosen over ST (the right call)
4-SS took a big swing with GED-0301 (biotech takes big swings and misses often - not fatal)
5-the Otezla number was taken down (horrible, -near fatal and it was the wrong call)
6-ozanimod RTF (near fatal)

Really a perfect storm. An outgoing chairman focused on betting Menendez, a new CEO that didn't catch the ozanimod screw up, and inexperience taking down the Otezla number together proved fatal.

But make no mistake, we would have been purchased long before this one had we never launched I&I. We simply couldn't sell the paper anymore given the Rev patent risk.
Click to expand...
All true and the fact that SS screwed up the Ozanimod submission really set us back! Wall Street was believing what Celgene was selling them, that Celgene would be an I&I company in the future !
 






anonymous said:
All true and the fact that SS screwed up the Ozanimod submission really set us back! Wall Street was believing what Celgene was selling them, that Celgene would be an I&I company in the future !
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And it was BH who Wall Street trusted and believed in. We were running on fumes by last December and Wall Street had enough! It was pay back time & boy did they ever run us into the ground for all the failed expectations & promises from BH’s glory days. Celgene would never be the same!
 






anonymous said:
All true and the fact that SS screwed up the Ozanimod submission really set us back! Wall Street was believing what Celgene was selling them, that Celgene would be an I&I company in the future !
Click to expand...


Don't underestimate the damage of taking down the Otezla number right after the Mongerson failure. It didn't need to be done. Otezla remains a miracle. It's a 2 billion dollar placebo. The problem was that no one in leadership understood how much market access drives the brand. We still have critical people in place who don't think the 340B, Medicare and Medicaid business are worthwhile. Really? Go ask Abbvie or Novartis or Amgen how much more commercial insurance they book because docs can get their products when the write non-commercial.
 






anonymous said:
Don't underestimate the damage of taking down the Otezla number right after the Mongerson failure. It didn't need to be done. Otezla remains a miracle. It's a 2 billion dollar placebo. The problem was that no one in leadership understood how much market access drives the brand. We still have critical people in place who don't think the 340B, Medicare and Medicaid business are worthwhile. Really? Go ask Abbvie or Novartis or Amgen how much more commercial insurance they book because docs can get their products when the write non-commercial.
Click to expand...
NA?
 
























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