CONTINUED....
We are not persuaded by Clark’s arguments. As an initial matter, Clark’s citing of Dawson is inapposite, as Dawson did not address a situation in which a § 146 action had been filed subsequent to a decision of the Board. Rather, the Dawson panel stated that if, following the panel’s decision:
[A] reissue application is filed, the Examiner will undertake an examination of that reissue application. 35 U.S.C. § 131. If in the opinion of the Examiner, a rejection based on Deckler is appropriate, the Examiner is free to make the rejection notwithstanding any attempt by Dawson in the motion conceding priority to preempt action by the Examiner. 35 U.S.C. § 132. When a judgment is entered in an interference, the estoppel provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.127(a) become applicable. As the Board indicated in Kaufman v. Talieh, Interference 105,233, Paper 23, page 2 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. Nov. 19, 2004) (Exhibit 1003), reservations made in concessions of priority do “not negate the effects of 37 CFR § 41.127 […] regarding interference estoppel.”
Dawson, p. 5, ll. 5-15. Dawson thus addresses whether the Examiner may apply estoppel in the examination of a reissue application after a final decision of the Board. Id. The issue that Clark has brought before the panel for rehearing is whether a judgment of the Board under Bd.R. 127(a)(1) in a first interference invokes Deckler-type estoppel or interference estoppel (issue preclusion) in a second, related interference, when a § 146 action has been filed in the first interference. Dawson does not address this issue at all; no § 146 action was filed subsequent to the judgment, and the Board’s ruling with respect to the Examiner’s possible finding of estoppel in a subsequent reissue examination, is not relevant to the question before the panel.
decision from precluding certain issues…; a judgment by an agency can have preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuits if the parties had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ and the agency rendered the decision while acting in a ‘judicial capacity.’” Abbott GMBH & Co., KG v. Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc., 870 F.Supp.2d 206, 221 (D. Mass.,2012) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Min. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)). When those requirements are fulfilled, the agency judgment will ordinarily have preclusive effect, provided that the prerequisites for preclusion outlined in Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc. v. El Dia, Inc., 490 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2007) are present. Abbott, 870 F.Supp.2d at 221 (citing Global NAPs, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep’t of Telecomm. & Energy, 427 F.3d 34, 14 44 (1st Cir.2005); Aunyx Corp. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 978 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir.1992). The Ramallo test states that the decision of one tribunal precludes re- litigation of the same issue in a subsequent lawsuit if “(1) the issue sought to be precluded in the later action is the same as that involved in the earlier action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was determined by a valid and binding final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the judgment.” Ramallo, 490 F.3d at 90
I will skip now to the end...
We consequently conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, a judgment of the Board under Bd.R. 127(a)(1) is not a judgment sufficiently final to invoke an estoppel. Clark’s request for rehearing is granted to the extent that we have considered its arguments, but its request that we reverse the decision of the administrative patent judge is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
THIS IS THE DECISION THAT I WAS WAITING FOR: IN MY HUMBLE OPINION IT SHOWS US WHO WILL WIN THE SECOND INTERFERENCE (IDENIX). THEY WILL MAINTAIN SENIOR POSITION IN THIS INTERFERENCE AND THUS BE "ALLOWED" TO USE THEIR EARLIER DATED PATENTS.