Glossary of Hostile Takeover Terms with Discussion

  • Shoham   Feb 19, 2015 at 12:03: AM
Hi everyone:

Just like to say that I was hoping Actavis would choose to keep the Allergan name for the combined company. Doing so is a further indication that Actavis recognizes that they bought into a valuable brand and culture, not just a portfolio of cash products.

In other news, the deal premium is now down to $4.32, or 1.9% of the AGN shareprice (the deal premium is the difference between the Allergan share price and the value of the Actavis offer -- it serves as an indication of how certain the market is that the transaction will close). Readers of my earlier posts know that I considered the premium in the first month after the announcement ($15-18) to be insanely high. I still don't have a theory as to why it was so high before, but it is now at a much more reasonable level. I'd expect that after the March 10 votes, it will decline further and the disappear altogether in the final days before closing.

Dan.
 




Hey Dan,

Fabers comments on Friday re:Salix were incredible- Pyott was gonna do the deal at $185 to stay independent. Press reports said months ago that he had been talking with Salix way back in fall of 2014! Amazing how his choices turned out. So sad...but

What do you think will happen with Salix? Getting near the end?
Press leaks are coming out just like you described in our deal and many of the same
characters involved. Valeant could lose another one despite press reports...

Thanks for the education..and best to you..
 




  • Shoham   Feb 21, 2015 at 07:10: PM
Hey Dan,

Fabers comments on Friday re:Salix were incredible- Pyott was gonna do the deal at $185 to stay independent. Press reports said months ago that he had been talking with Salix way back in fall of 2014! Amazing how his choices turned out. So sad...but

What do you think will happen with Salix? Getting near the end?
Press leaks are coming out just like you described in our deal and many of the same
characters involved. Valeant could lose another one despite press reports...

Thanks for the education..and best to you..

Saw the Faber clip. It actually said that Pyott was days away from paying $205/share for Salix, but walked when the due diligence uncovered the inventory "issue" (read "fraud").

From the overall chorus of leaks, I think there is a better-than-even chance that Valeant will indeed acquire Salix in the coming days.

There are some explainable oddities to this deal. I'll elaborate.

Oddity #1: Allergan was going to buy Salix under the theory that Salix is so incompatible with the Valeant acquisition business model (because Salix has a lot of R&D and not much in product sales to justify it's price) that it will no longer be viable for Valeant to acquire the combined Allergan-Salix company. If that's the case, then how come Valeant is even contemplating buying Salix directly?
The answer has to do with price. Not only did the purchase price for Salix go down (from $205, that Allergan was preparing to pay -- to which you have to add a control premium that Valeant would have to pay when they buy the combined Allergan-Salix company -- to ~$165, the presumed purchase price for the upcoming transaction); but, more importantly, Valeant shareprice has gone way up since losing the Allergan deal, from around $120 to over $170 now. This is important because Valeant uses it's shares as a currency (in the case of Allergan, it was going to be a about 2/3 of the overall purchase consideration). Even if the actual deal is, technically, in cash; the Valeant market capitalization serves as a form of security against the loans and is thus relevant. Another way of looking at this is through the concept of "accretive" and "dilutive" transactions. A generally useful and widely followed measure of a company's profitability is "earnings per share" (EPS), the ratio of its earnings to its shareprice. When a company acquires another with a higher EPS (at the acquisition price), the deal is said to be accretive, because the EPS of the combined company will be higher than beforehand -- investors, credit rating agencies, bondholders, and everyone else love to hear this; when lower, it is dilutive (in which case, the acquirer better have an explanation -- such as a strong R&D pipeline -- as to why they are paying so much). With Valeant shareprice going so high with no corresponding increase in earnings, their EPS is declining; thus making deals that before would have been dilutive into accretive. (I can't actually do the math for this because it depends on how much cost-cutting "synergies" will be part of the deal). When the announcement comes, look in the press release for the word "accretive" (or "dilutive").

Oddity #2: Didn't Valeant just say that they are off big acquisition for a long time?
While Salix is a lot smaller than Allergan, at a pre-acquisition market cap of $10B (presumably a bit more at acquisition price), that's still, by far, the biggest acquisition in Valeant's history (B&L was about $7B). I am sure that their answer will be that Salix is such a great opportunity that it was worth coming out of hibernation to acquire. The real answer is that they were forced to stop acquisitions when their access to capital was tapped out with the collapse of the Allergan deal. However, when their stock price skyrocketed afterward (a development that flies in the face of my earlier predictions -- I don't get everything right -- and is still a mystery to me), they suddenly gained "balance sheet flexibility" -- the ability to finance more acquisitions using their newly empowered equity and borrowing power. I think it's safe to say that Valeant is back in the (acquisition) game; but, I'd venture to speculate that they sufficiently learned their lesson not to try another hostile takeover for a long time.

Oddity #3: After an accounting fraud, a company is supposedly toxic for acquisitions, how come Salix is in play?
Salix really did do a credible job of cleaning house. First, the CFO and CEO are both out -- not only removing the tainted individuals, but also sending an organization-wide message that you won't get away with allowing fraud under your watch (whether you know of it or not). I imagine some other tainted individuals of lesser stature also found their way to the door. Second, they did a fully audited restatement of their financial statements (turned out the fraud -- while material -- was not bigger than initially disclosed; there is always a fear, when fraud is discovered, that the initial revelations are the tip of the iceberg -- and thus, there is relief if it turns out that it isn't the case). So, with a properly chastised sale price, they are back in play. Of course, while most acquirers stay away from even the slightest hint of accounting fraud, Valeant is probably laughing with a "let the big boys teach you how to do accounting fraud properly..." (just kidding, after the Allergan experience, I think Valeant learned to reduce opacity and shenanigance in their financial statements; so even the great gray Valeant is now probably cleaner than before -- maybe part of the answer to the shareprice rise mystery)

Let me finally note that it is sad to see Valeant getting their clutches on yet another fine R&D house. When the Salix inventory story first broke I said that many hard-working Salix people will suffer for the needless sins of a few. I was sadly correct. If the top Salix people played it clean -- and they were doing just great even without any dirty accounting -- there is a good chance that company would now be part of the big happy R&D-focused independent Allergan (or at least Actavis), rather than facing the icy embrace of Valeant.

Dan.
 




Thanks Dan. So takeout for $158. Was hoping for someone else to bid instead of Valeant as well. Salix folks should be okay, those tenured there were taken care of pretty well and it looks like sales people will remain largely intact. Shire would have been a better fit.
On Valeant and its share price- imo they just know how to juice the street with positive earnings pronouncements (true or not?) They have a call on Monday am to discuss earnings and the deal.

Read that Pearson was under pressure to make a mid level buyout from investors and Salix was a perfect choice. $10 billion more in the hole even tho the deal will be slowly accretive.
Unreal they pay 4% in taxes
 








Yea...Salix greed got them in the end and snuffed Allergan..what a story

Dan, What do you think Salix will do with their new Endo offer? Is it better than all cash?

Nice if Valeant leaves the dance again without a partner
 




Hey why are you bit cheaper still on Valeant's tip? Don't worry you all will be our bitch or loving partner by this time next year. Oh wait have you Allergan losers will be laid of by then.... including Dan's imaginary wife.
 












  • Shoham   Mar 14, 2015 at 01:51: AM
Re: The Beginning of the Endgame

Hi everyone:

For those of you who are still following the M&A scene, the Salix story is now getting into a very interesting phase -- with a new bidder (Endo) coming in even after a definitive agreement to sell Salix to Valeant. I'll likely write a post about that story shortly. However, for today, my focus is on a Salix SEC filing that sheds a lot of light on how our own merger happened.

To read the full Salix filing (with a lot of very interesting aspects not reproduced here):
(http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1009356/000119312515079935/d884202dsc14d9.htm).

When the Board signs a definitive merger agreement, it must make a statement to its shareholders, filed with the SEC, recommending that they approve the transaction and providing justification. The filing must disclose every relevant information for the shareholders to make a decision, even if the disclosure is very embarrassing to the Board (for example, for turning down a higher offer previously). In this context, we got a very definitive timeline of the events surrounding the Allergan-Actavis-Salix merger talks.

(Just to add more embarrassment to the way the Salix Board has been handling this, merely hours after this recommendation-to-approve was filed, Endo made its much-higher bid; and thus definitively demonstrating that the agreed sale price was less than what they could have gotten if they did their job well).


Before we get started, let’s remind ourselves the week when the Allergan-Actavis-Salix triangle was first leaked. I made a very long post at the end of that week, the summary of which is reproduced here. We can now go back and see what was really happening that week (as well as beforehand and afterward):

[...]

MONDAY (9/22)
1. The Treasury Department announced inversions crackdown
2. Allergan ordered to provide non-redacted Board Minutes to Valeant/PS lawyers
3. Leaked news that Allergan turned down an all-cash offer from Actavis
4. Leaked news that Allergan in advanced talks to buy Salix


TUESDAY (9/23)
5. Ackman threatens to sue Allergan if it buys Salix without a shareholder vote
6. Leaked news that Pfizer were in talks to buy Actavis


WEDNESDAY (9/24)
7. Leaked news that Actavis had preliminary talks to buy Salix
8. Valeant up guidance for Q3
9. Both Allergan and Valeant shares skyrocket
10. Valeant exchanges public letters with Allergan


THURSDAY (9/25)
11. Valeant announces successful Phase III trial for $1B Glaucoma drug
12. ValueAct returns to Valeant Board
13. Valeant share price continues spiking up in an otherwise very down market
14. Pentwater Capital letter to Allergan opposing Salix deal


FRIDAY (9/26)
15. T Rowe Price letter to Allergan opposing Salix deal without shareholder vote

SATURDAY (!) (9/27)
16. Letter from Jackson Square Partners to Allergan opposing Salix deal

[...]

Dan.


Now, back to the Salix SEC filing. The filing itself is about 60 pages long, but the most interesting part is in a section labeled " Background and Reasons for the Recommendation ". Here is a shortened reproduction of the main items (in red), with a bit of running commentary (in blue]). If it's not obvious, "Party A" is Allergan and "Party B" is Actavis.

Background and Reasons for the Recommendation

On November 7, 2013, the Chief Executive Officer of Party A contacted the Company’s then Chief Executive Officer, Carolyn Logan, and requested a meeting with Ms. Logan [to express interest in acquiring Salix].
[...]

On March 13, 2014, [...] the Board unanimously determined not to provide Party A with access to due diligence materials at the time.
[...]

So, even before Valeant came along (but as we now know, the Allergan Board was concerned about Valeant for a long time before the launch of the hostile take over attempt), Allergan was already asking Salix for due diligence; but Salix wasn’t interested. (From text not reproduced here, the reason Salix was not interested is because they wanted to do an inversion – before that concept blew up in their face).

On June 27, 2014, the Chief Executive Officer of Party A contacted Ms. Logan with a request to meet. Ms. Logan scheduled a meeting with the Party A Chief Executive Officer to be held on July 29, 2014, which was discussed with the Board on July 7, 2014. At this meeting, the Party A Chief Executive Officer made an oral offer to acquire the Company at an all cash price of $180 per share, subject to Party A’s satisfactory completion of a due diligence review of the Company
[...]

Ok. Valeant is knocking, and Allergan is getting serious about Salix; making an oral offer. It is worth noting that Pyott, with no due diligence, without knowing about the accounting fraud, just based on doing his homework from public sources only, making an opening oral offer, nailed the valuation right on the head – with his price ($180) almost exactly the same as Endo, with a lot more information, is offering now.

On August 13, 2014, [...] the Board unanimously determined that Ms. Logan should advise Party A’s Chief Executive Officer that the $180 per share offer was insufficient to form the basis for discussions between the parties, including the commencement of due diligence by Party A, but that the Board would review any improved offer [...].
[...]
On August 20, 2014, the Party A Chief Executive Officer called Ms. Logan to communicate an increase in Party A’s proposal from $180 to $200 per share in cash. The Party A Chief Executive Officer advised that Party A’s intention was to be in a position to complete due diligence and announce a transaction within three weeks. [...]

On August 22, 2014, [...] After a detailed discussion, the Board unanimously authorized (i) Ms. Logan to contact the Party A Chief Executive Officer with a counter-offer at $210 per share, (ii) management to agree, subject to negotiation, and Board approval, of a definitive merger agreement, to an all-cash transaction at $205 per share or more (including agreeing to a period of exclusive negotiations at such price) and (iii) management to permit Party A to conduct due diligence on the Company.
[...]

On August 26, 2014, the Party A Chief Executive Officer advised Ms. Logan that the Party A Board of Directors had initially viewed Party A’s $200 per share offer as its best and final offer, but that in exchange for a three week period of exclusivity, it would increase its offer to $205 per share, in cash. The Party A Chief Executive Officer noted that this offer was Party A’s best and final offer. Later that day, the Board [agreed].
[...]

We have a deal. Allergan will go to $205, as long as the due diligence is good. Pyott’s initial sense that the company is worth $180 was, we now know, dead on target; but their books were implying that they are worth $205. So, Pyott basically said that if your books check out, I’ll pay you the $205, if not; we will see…

During the course of the next seven days, Party A conducted its due diligence review of the Company concurrently with the negotiation of the definitive merger agreement.

On September 4, 2014, Party A raised questions regarding the data provided by the Company with respect to in-channel inventory and advised the Company that Party A needed to conduct additional due diligence.

On September 15, 2014, Party A advised the Company that it had become concerned with the levels of wholesaler inventory of the Company’s key products in the distribution channel. Further discussions regarding the potential transaction ceased while Party A further reviewed this matter.

On September 22, 2014, The New York Times reported that Party A was in discussions to acquire the Company.
[...]

So, even before the story first leaks, Allergan is already beginning to back off Salix

On September 23, 2014, the Party A Chief Executive Officer advised Ms. Logan that Party A was decreasing its proposed purchase price to acquire the Company to $175 per share as a result of its review of wholesaler inventory levels of the Company’s key products.

Right back to where Pyott was before the too-smart-for-their-own-good Salix thought that he is so desperate as to overbid – actually a bit lower.

Also on September 23, 2014, the Chief Executive Officer of Party B contacted Ms. Logan to express Party B’s interest in commencing discussions for Party B to acquire the Company.

On September 24, 2014, [...] The Board discussed Party A’s revised proposal and Party B’s invitation to discuss a potential acquisition of the Company by Party B. Following a detailed discussion, the Board unanimously determined to advise Party A that it was not willing to discuss a transaction at the substantially lower offer price, with the goal of compelling Party A to increase its offer. The Board also determined (with Mr. Chappell dissenting) to authorize management to respond to Party B’s invitation to discuss its potential acquisition of the Company in order to obtain additional information, including Party B’s proposed purchase price and anticipated timeline for entering into a transaction. Mr. Chappell expressed the view that the Company should instead refocus on the Company’s standalone plan if discussions with Party A were potentially going to be discontinued.
Following the Company’s response to Party A, Party A did not make any revised proposal or initiate any further contact with the Company until later contacted by the Company, as more fully described below.

On September 24, 2014, several media outlets reported on Party B’s interest in a potential acquisition of the Company. During intra-day trading, the Shares achieved their all-time high trading price of $172.98 per share.
[...]

Salix is so sure Allergan is desperate for a transaction that they basically told Allergan that they don’t care about the failed diligence; they want something closer to the $205 discussed earlier. Allergan walks away. Actavis comes into the picture on the same day Allergan walks. This detail is a bit of a new twist. Previously, it appeared that Salix was talking with Allergan and Actavis simultaneously. However, it seems that Actavis gracefully waited for Allergan to walk away before budding in. Score a point to Saunders for being classy. My earlier speculation that Allergan may have tipped Actavis about the inventory issue at Salix is somewhat mooted by this timeline, but in a way it is also accurate. Since Actavis did their due diligence after Allergan walked away, it is essentially a certainty that they would have asked why Allergan walked away and that Salix would have been compelled to answer truthfully.
Another loose end that this time line is tiding up concerns the angry shareholders letters trying to stop Allergan from buying Salix without a shareholder vote. I earlier estimated that by the time these letters were written, Allergan has already walked away from Salix, and the letter writers were “wasting their tongue.” This is now confirmed. The poison letters were dated between 9/25 and 9/27, whereas Allergan walked away on 9/24.

On September 30, 2014, Party B delivered a letter to the Company setting forth a preliminary proposal, subject to its completion of a satisfactory due diligence review of the Company, to acquire the Company at a price range of $178 to $185 per share, with 60% to 70% of the consideration to be paid in cash and the remainder in Party B stock.

On October 1, 2014, [...] After a detailed discussion, (i) the Board determined (with Mr. Chappell dissenting) to authorize management to allow Party B to perform due diligence and negotiate with Party B with respect to its proposal and (ii) the Board unanimously agreed to authorize Company management to contact Party A to ascertain whether Party A remained interested in a potential transaction.
[...]

On October 9, 2014, the Chief Executive Officer of Party B advised Ms. Logan that Party B would not be proceeding with a transaction, citing concerns with the transaction from an antitrust perspective.

Hmm. This I haven’t seen before. So Actavis walked away because of Antitrust, not inventory. Hmm. Hmm. Since Actavis was talking $178-185 (about same as Allergan’s numbers), presumably they already factored the inventory issue into their math. Walking away due to antitrust is not unheard off, but not very common either. In general, the products of a company aren’t exactly a secret. If the overlap of the prospective acquirer and target is so large as to make the antitrust issue a deal killer, it would presumably be known beforehand. Due Diligence is an expensive and disruptive process; not to be engaged in if a simple product charts comparison would have already established that the deal is undoable due to antitrust. The big exception is if there is something really big, and antitrust-triggering, in the pipeline (and thus a secret, until disclosed during due diligence). So, I guess this is the case. BTW, if the pre-Allergan Actavis was already antitrust-constrained from buying Salix, it is a near certainty that the post-merger Actavis won’t get into the bidding for Salix.

On October 13, 2014, the Chief Executive Officer of Party A advised Ms. Logan that Party A would not be proceeding with a transaction at the time, but may re-approach the Company after the Company’s announcement of third quarter earnings.

Translation: “Stop pestering us about buying you anywhere near the $205 we mentioned before we discovered your inventory problem, and stop pretending it’s not a big deal, and, despite what you may have been reading in the Wall Street press, we are not nearly as desperate as you think we are. So, here is what we are going to do. We will wait patiently until you report your Q3 numbers. You will have to admit your inventory problem, your share price will crash, and then we will be able to again talk, with more realistic valuation numbers (and you shall regret not taking out $175).


During the period following Party A’s expression of potential concerns regarding the levels of wholesaler inventory of the Company’s key products in the distribution channel, management, under the direction of the Board, engaged in a detailed review of the facts and circumstances with respect to the inventory levels of the Company’s key products, including whether such facts and circumstances raised any significant accounting concerns or impacted the Company’s reported financials.

On October 14, 2014, the Board directed the Audit Committee of the Board (the “Audit Committee”) to conduct a review (with outside counsel retained by the Audit Committee) with respect to inventory-related disclosures and related matters.

On November 6, 2014, in connection with the release of the Company’s financial and operating results for the quarter ended September 30, 2014, the Company announced wholesaler inventory levels for certain of its key products that were in excess of the amounts indicated by the Company’s Chief Financial Officer on previous investor conference calls. [...] The Company also announced on November 6, 2014 that its Chief Financial Officer had resigned [...]

At the open of trading on November 7, 2014, the Shares opened at a price of $90.17 per share, an approximately 35% reduction from the closing price of $138.55 on November 6, 2014 [...].

… Exactly as Pyott was expecting …

Shortly following the Company’s announcement, the Chief Executive Officer of Party A contacted Ms. Logan to inquire whether the Company would be interested in reengaging with Party A to discuss a potential acquisition of the Company by Party A, and proposed a meeting between senior management of the Company and Party A to be held on November 20, 2014.
[...]

This is super-interesting. Pyott calls Salix (he doesn’t even need to say “I told you so, you guys really blew it when you didn’t take my $175”) and then schedules the meeting for November 20 (!!!). As we now know, this meeting didn’t happen because it was 3 days after the Allergan-Actavis announcement. At this point, clearly, the Actavis-Allergan negotiations are fairly hot, and probably already targeting November 17 for an announcement. So Pyott is clearly setting up Salix as his “plan-B,” in case the Actavis deal break.


On November 17, 2014, Party A and Party B announced that they had entered into a definitive agreement pursuant to which Party B would acquire Party A.​



This last entry (about Pyott having set up a November 20 meeting with Salix) also, finally, solves some mysteries I pointed out a week after the announcement:


Hi Everyone:

Now that the main news is sinking in, over the next few posts I want to cover some loose ends. The first of which is a duo of share price mysteries.


Share Price Mysteries

Maybe there is nothing to it, the universe doesn't work in perfect synchronicity, and the numbers will work themselves to where they should be soon enough. I waited a week to see if that happens, and as it didn't; I have to at least think about the possibility that there is more to it.

Mystery #1: Why did Actavis pay so much?
I think it's fair to say that if we reached the special shareholders meeting on December 18, the Board wasn't going to win the "trust us to keep doing what we were doing" argument. While we don't know exactly how high Valeant would have gone in a competitive situation, they were already having some serious difficulties formalizing the $200 figure they've previously uttered; and they publicly said (after the fact) that $219 is way too rich for their blood. So, let's say, Valeant would have maxed out at, tops, $205. All this would have been well understood and internalized by both the Allergan and Actavis negotiation teams and placed a hard cap on Allergan's negotiating power: Allergan had to make a deal before December 18 and didn't have any backup opportunity above ~$205, so there was no need for Actavis to go any higher. In fact, it would be a violation of their fiduciary responsibility to their own shareholders to pay any more than the minimum that would get the deal done. While there is some room for imprecise estimations and business judgement, a $14/share ( = $219 - $205) difference means that Actavis left $4.2B ( = $14 x 300M shares) on the table. Said another way, if Actavis were to definitively say "$205 -- take it or leave it," -- it's hard to see Allergan leaving it and then having to face the Shareholder meeting with no real alternative to Valeant.

Mystery #2: Why is Allergan trading at such a big discount to the deal amount?
The closing share prices on the announcement day (Monday) for ACT and AGN shares were $248 and $209, respectively, meaning that AGN was trading $12 below the deal value ( = .37 x $248 + $129 - $209). That difference extended to $16, or about 8% of AGN share price, by Friday. That's a very big discount. It is normal, after a deal is signed, but before it closes, for there to be a small difference (say 1-2%), accounting for the ever-present possibility that something will go wrong. During the long months of the Valeant battle, AGN was never lower than ~2% below the Valeant deal price (which Ackman used to argue meant the Valeant deal was inevitable). How could it possibly be that a signed friendly deal, with a $2B breakup fee, that both sets of boards, managements, and shareholders clearly want; is judged as substantially more at risk than a hostile offer that was fought tooth-and-nail throughout and ultimately failed? This mystery deepens further when we consider that Valeant is still providing a floor to AGN (particularly now that VRX shareprice is enjoying a bit of a renaissance -- more on that in a future post). If the ACT deal implodes, Valeant will likely come back (they said they will!). Yes, PS sold all their shares, but they sold them at ~$209; after an implosion they could buy them back for less. Valeant might not feel they need to pay $200 for the chastised AGN, but will probably not win for less than $180 -- a price Valeant is very clearly happy to pay for AGN. So, really, from a risk arbitrage point of view, $180 is the floor (probably more like $186 -- since ACT will be paying a $6 breakup fee if they walk). So, AGN is trading at a $16 discount to the deal value, when the worst that could plausibly happen (from a shareholder perspective), if the ACT deal implodes and VRX returns, is a ~$24 drop. Meaning that the market is assigning a ~40% ( = 16/(16+24) ) chance that the deal will break -- an insanely high risk rating for a signed deal with no known opponents.

Highly speculative Theory:
I have to go very deep into the speculative zone to try and resolve these two mysteries. Furthermore, it is most likely that whatever theory I put forth will never be factually confirmed or debunked (only if the Actavis deal breaks -- which it probably won't -- will there really be a chance that we hear anything more about this, even then, not for sure). With regard to mystery #1 (why Actavis paid so much), the answer has to be that there was some other opportunity -- more attractive to the Board than Valeant -- that Actavis was competing with and needed to get to $219 to beat. What was that opportunity? -- a deal with a properly chastised Salix or Shire, another acquisition target not mentioned before, yet another White Knight bidder (which would be unbelievably amazing), or even something more creative? That I can't tell (and likely never will); but I got to believe that there was another plausible opportunity, alive and relevant, that Actavis was bidding against; not just Valeant. As for mystery #2 (why the big discount): Perhaps the market is spooked that the mystery alternative is a stay-independent no-vote-needed acquisition that makes Allergan too big for Valeant, and that the Board, no longer facing a special shareholder meeting, will opt to bail on Actavis, pay the breakup fees, and actualize the mystery alternative (with no huge regard to a potentially cratering stock price). Far-fetched? Probably. Plausible? Probably not. But, I can't think of any better explanation to these two mysteries.

Dan.

So, apparently my first speculative guess was exactly right: “a deal with a properly chastised Salix.” I honestly expected to never learn the answer to this question. Little did I suspect that the answer will come a mere 4 months later from the unlikely source of a Salix SEC filing…

Hope everyone is doing well!!

Dan.
 




Dan,

Thanks for your continued insight. I've learned more about mergers and acquisitions in the last year than I ever dreamed of.

As an Allergan employee, I really wish that they had been a little more aggressive in the acquisition game.

Rumor is that we will find out next week who from Irvine will be impacted. A very sad day for Allergan.
 




Dan,

Thanks for your continued insight. I've learned more about mergers and acquisitions in the last year than I ever dreamed of.

As an Allergan employee, I really wish that they had been a little more aggressive in the acquisition game.

Rumor is that we will find out next week who from Irvine will be impacted. A very sad day for Allergan.

Yes, it's a shame that Pyott did so little so late.
 




Again many thanks Dan. I've very much enjoyed your commentary and have learned a lot. It's going to be an interesting ride now if I survive the synergy fall out. Looking forward to it if I am here. It's going to be an opportunity to learn and update.
Best Wishes to you and your family.
 








Welcome to "Growth Pharma!"

It's funny looking back at Valeant - Allergan - Actavis dance, it was more like Kabuki Theater. Rock bottom, it's always about the investors, big money and share price.

When this crazy patchwork of companies, products, leadership, "R&D" (hahaha) and whatever other weird appendages gets sold off to Pfizer or another bidder or "merged" with whoever it will be the end of the road. This whole thread will be a relic of a time when Actavis was looked at as a "White Knight" that was going to save Allergan, when it was instead a shady backroom deal between two "buddies" to send share price to the moon.

Here is a question: what is Actavis/Allergan's debt load look like? Does this creature even make any real money or is it just an investor/fee/lawyer/shareholder vehicle that is close to having the engine blow, wheels fall off and a whole bunch of passengers (sales/R&D etc) get jettisoned through the windshield into a brick wall?

White Knight? Ha, hardly. Allergan still gets smashed.
 




Allergan definitely got smashed. Over 40% cut in my dept and we focus on late phase projects.

Actavis as far as a white knight is concerned, is better than nothing but not by much.

For impacted employees, Actavis is still better than Valeant. Valeant wouldn't have honored our severance.
 




Since the layoffs this past week occurred does anyone know the total number of employees left at the Irvine location and how many were let go in this last round? While Valeant would have completely shut down Irvine--it seems like a massive amount of experienced workers were let go this round.
 




Since the layoffs this past week occurred does anyone know the total number of employees left at the Irvine location and how many were let go in this last round? While Valeant would have completely shut down Irvine--it seems like a massive amount of experienced workers were let go this round.

Some got let go, some got let go and replaced with "consultants" for less money, some where rolled up into other divisions...so on and so forth. This is all window dressing, the next round will be when this Frankenstein's monster is sold to Pfizer or "merged" with Pfizer or some other company you will see the real cuts take place....cuts that include entire companies and product lines and R&D.
 




Some got let go, some got let go and replaced with "consultants" for less money, some where rolled up into other divisions...so on and so forth. This is all window dressing, the next round will be when this Frankenstein's monster is sold to Pfizer or "merged" with Pfizer or some other company you will see the real cuts take place....cuts that include entire companies and product lines and R&D.

I think this point was brought up with Saunders recently on whether the rumors of Pfizer were true and his response appeared to be that he was not interested as it would have to be a very very high premium--it might be too much debt for pfizer to take on.
 




I think this point was brought up with Saunders recently on whether the rumors of Pfizer were true and his response appeared to be that he was not interested as it would have to be a very very high premium--it might be too much debt for pfizer to take on.

They have so much cash in the bank and free cash flow, they can do the deal. It will be a "challenge" but there is a reason that both companies had many a meeting before the Allergan deal.