In February 2012 J. Corasanti claimed “Altrus is proceeding very, very well” and reiterated the $5-10 million revenue guidance. But two months later management hedged again, saying the launch was “not moving as fast as we thought” and blamed “continuing manufacturing difficulties” owing to its “being a complicated product to produce”; all product shipping ceased for several weeks. Despite reconfirming the revenue guidance at that time management dropped it again in July to $4-6 million. In October the salesforce reemerged as the scapegoat, as management blamed poor training for fresh setbacks. It also alluded to new commercial challenges, admitting “we are going to have to start now to pay attention to GPO contracts,” as if that were news. It whacked revenue guidance again, to $2.0-2.5 million.
By February 2013, management was confidently forecasting $5-10 million again in Altrus revenues. But just as in prior years, by April 2013 management retreated and cut its forecast once more (to $4-5 million). For the first time, management cited pricing pressures on Altrus – surprising indeed, given management’s long-held insistence that it could displace incumbents Covidien and Johnson & Johnson with a premium-priced product. ConMed stubbornly clung to pricing Altrus at $750 per tip despite a widespread view that Covidien was delivering an effective price (through bundling and discounts) of almost 1/2 of that on its market-leading Ligasure product. We don’t take issue with management’s belief in the technological superiority of Altrus but we question its judgment in trying to displace a deeply entrenched competitor with a product priced at such a rich premium, regardless of its efficacy.6 In May management conceded that Altrus has a “longer selling cycle … than we expected.” By July management referred again to pricing compression and, for the first time, suggested they were encountering resistance from purchasing managers due to a lack of clinical preference, making this simply the latest gaffe in the never-ending Altrus comedy of errors.
ConMed refused to provide any 2014 revenue guidance for Altrus on the 3Q13 call, but we estimate that Altrus’ lifetime-to-date revenues (since 2008) are generously about $4 million – a market penetration of at most 0.1%.7
It is very disturbing and refreshing to see an outsider's brilliant view of an organization that has screwed over some excellent representatives. One can only hope that management gets what they deserve.