Great link here for those interested in the Silverberg derivative suit against Susan Bayh and other directors of the company. The Silverberg case argues a Brophy claim (insider trading). Two elements have to be present to satisfy a Brophy claim. The judge denied the motion to dismiss. The judge feels there is reasonable grounds for the lawsuit to continue with this Brophy claim.
http://www.leagle.com/decision/In DECO 20131231051
Below is the 2nd element. The rest is in the link but too much to post here. Interesting reading.
"2. The Complaint supports a reasonable inference that Defendants Bayh and Watson acted with scienter when they sold their shares in Dendreon
The second element of a Brophy claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the corporate fiduciary used material, nonpublic information improperly by making trades, at least in part, because of the substance of that information. For Brophy claims, "Delaware case law makes the same policy judgment as federal law does, which is that insider trading claims depend importantly on proof that the selling defendants acted with scienter."68 In other words, a plaintiff must allege that the selling defendant, at least in part, "consciously acted to exploit" the fact that they possessed material, nonpublic information.69
Silverberg argues that the requisite scienter reasonably can be inferred from the timing and size of Bayh, Watson, and Brewer's stock sales, as well as from the sales of other Company insiders. Defendants respond that Bayh, Watson, and Brewer's stock sales can be explained entirely by the fact that they coincide with the announcement of Provenge receiving FDA approval. In particular, Defendants emphasize the importance of FDA approval of Provenge to the Company and the fact that such an important event was disclosed immediately to the market. According to Defendants, therefore, April 29, 2010 and the few days immediately after that date constituted an ideal time for Company insiders to sell shares because it was unlikely that they possessed material, nonpublic information at that time.
During the Relevant Period (i.e., April 29, 2010 to July 25, 2011), Defendants sold over $78 million worth of the Company's stock. Of that amount, over $56 million, or approximately 70%, was sold within one day of the FDA approving Provenge on April 29, 2010.70 Because there are entirely legitimate reasons that corporate insiders would sell large amounts of their stock after a major public announcement, such conduct should not, and does not, create a presumption that those insiders were attempting to take advantage of material, nonpublic information in their possession.71 In this case, however, Defendants' large-scale disposal of stock immediately following the FDA's approval of Provenge is accompanied by alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference that Defendants knew when they sold that, at a minimum, there was a significant risk of the physician community being reluctant to prescribe Provenge because of the cost and reimbursement concerns associated with it, and that Defendants did not disclose that information to the public. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, therefore, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Defendants, including Bayh and Watson, intentionally exploited their informational advantage.
Bayh and Watson72 sold 77% and 58%, respectively, of their shares in the Company within a day of the FDA approval milestone. That was the first time either of them had sold any of their Dendreon shares, despite having served as Company directors for a combined 17 years. Moreover, there had been other significant events in the Company's history, such as in April 2009, when the Company announced that its Phase III drug trials were showing positive results. That development offered Company insiders a comparable opportunity to sell their stock. Indeed, Dendreon's stock price rose even more in that instance than it did when Provenge received FDA approval.73 It also is significant that Bayh and Watson's sales coincided with a large sell-off by Company insiders who were most likely to be aware of the true extent of the "reimbursement risk" that physicians associated with Provenge.74 Moreover, while this large sell-off by Bayh, Watson, and other Company insiders was ongoing, the Company both issued a press release and held a conference call with financial analysts, yet failed to make any mention of "reimbursement risk," or that the Company was aware that such a material risk existed.75 Because the Complaint supports a reasonable inference that Bayh and Watson possessed material, nonpublic information when they sold their shares, the facts that they (1) elected to sell after the stock reached a likely high point; (2) sold at the same time as others who possessed the same or more material, nonpublic information; and (3) evidently remained silent when the Company chose not to convey that material, nonpublic information to the market, despite having multiple opportunities to do so, all support a reasonable inference that Bayh and Watson "consciously acted to exploit" the fact that they possessed material, nonpublic information.
Based on the particularized allegations made in this case, Defendants' conduct, including that of at least Bayh and Watson, supports a reasonable inference that Defendants believed that because of the risk of physician reluctance to prescribe Provenge based on reimbursement concerns, FDA approval likely would be the high watermark for Dendreon's stock price, making it the ideal time to sell their shares. Therefore, it is also reasonable to infer, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that Defendants' purposefully availed themselves of the opportunity to sell their shares at a time when the stock price was likely as high as it would get and the market was ignorant of the fact that Provenge's commercial launch potentially would be weighed down by physician reluctance to prescribe the treatment. The fact that Defendants' concerns about the commercial success of Provenge because of potential or actual physician reluctance to prescribe the treatment came to fruition further supports the inference that Defendants, including Bayh and Watson, exploited their knowledge of material, nonpublic information for personal gain at the Company's expense. This reasonable inference of purposeful conduct is sufficient to establish a showing of scienter under the plaintiff friendly standard applicable at this early stage of the proceedings.76
Thus, Silverberg also has satisfied the second element of his Brophy claim in accordance with the requirements of Rule 23.1. That is, Plaintiff's allegations at the pleading stage are sufficient to support a finding that (1) Director Defendants Bayh and Watson face a substantial likelihood of liability on Plaintiff's claims; and, therefore, (2) a majority of the Company's Board would be unable to evaluate a demand in a disinterested and independent way.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied."